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(Ref. ETHICS AND� ANIMALS 1/2 
Review by JOHNSON of THE CASE 
OF THE ANIMALS VS. MAN BEFORE 
THE KING OF THE JINN; ETHICS 
11/2�AND ANIMALS  Reply by 
GOODMAN) 
In his reply to my review, 
Professor Goodman asserts:" • if 
suffering is involved in frustration 
of all desires, the fact that the 
desires in question are unlearned is 
irrelevant. The mention [by Peter 
Singer in Animal Liberation] of the 
innateness of desires seems to me to 
appeal to another (albeit natural) 
standard of value beyond the 
pleasure/pain calculus, namely 
naturalness." 
Is this a correct interpreation 
of Singer's argument? I believe not, 
as I indicated in my review. Singer's 
point is not that what is innate or 
natural has value ipso facto. Rather, 
the point of saying that the desires 
frustrated are innate is to emphasize 
that they do not have to be learned. 
Singer is arguing against those who 
have claimed that because the animal 
has never known any other life, it 
cannot be suffering. (See Animal 
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Liberation [1975], pp. 139, 142.) 
Singer is not committed to the view 
that, as Goodman puts it, "wrong has 
been done because nature is not 
allowed to run in its own course." 
In fact, I believe Singer would firmly 
(and rightly) reject such a view. 
But Singer can speak better than I 
about what he did or didn't mean. 
Professor Goodman also complains 
about my omitting mention of "existen­
tial claims to virtual subjecthood" 
in a passage I quoted which expresses 
one of his "central ideas." I omitted 
it because it seemed to me inessential 
and, frankly, because I had no idea 
what it meant. I still don't. 
Apparently, however, in foreshortening 
for the sak~ of intelligibility I 
inadvertently managed to suggest to 
Goodman that his "foundation for 
animal deserts is subjective rather 
than ontological and recognizable 
by (age old but here newly analyzed) 
projective (and rhetorical) devices." 
I didn't mean to suggest that. 
Indeed, I don't understand that any 
better than I do "existential claims 
to virtual subjecthood." 
It would be unreasonable, how­
ever, to expect Goodman to explain 
in the brief space of a reply what 
is undoubtedly a difficult and 
complex notion. He mentions that he 
has discussed the idea in some of 
his other works. I hope that he will 
write back and give references. No 
doubt other readers of this journal 
would also be interested in learning 
more about "virtual subjecthood as a 
foundation for the recognition of 
... a general theory of deserts." 
Edward Johnson 
University of New Orleans 
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(Ref. ETHICS AND ANIMALS 1/2 
Review by JOHNSON of THE CASE 
OF THE ANIMALS VS. MAN BEFORE 
THE KING OF THE JINN; ETHICS 
AND ANIMALS 11/2 Reply by
GOODMAN) 
In Ethics and Animals, Volume 2, 
No.2, Lenn Goodman says that he 
can find two arguments in my book 
Animal Liberation where Edward Johnson 
found only one. Johnson claimed that 
my objection to factory farming was 
simply based on the fact that it 
causes animal suffering. Lenn Goodman 
suggests that in addition to this 
consideration, I also appeal to the 
unnaturalness of the degree of 
confinement. He therefore finds an 
implication that "wrong has been done 
because nature is not allowed to run 
its own course." I am happy to be 
able to clear up this disagreement. 
Edward Johnson got it right. My 
ethical argument is based entirely 
on the degree of suffering involved 
in factory farming. It may sometimes 
be relevant to this suffering that 
factory farming frustrates desires 
which animals naturally have. The 
fact that the desires are "natural" 
or "unlearned" is relevant only in 
so far as it indicates that even a 
bird or an animal which has been 
brought up in confined conditions 
from birth will experience desires 
that are frustrated in factory farms. 
Birds and animals are usually well 
adapted for the conditions in which 
they naturally live. Conditions 
which are quite unnatural are there­
fore likely to frustrate their innate 
desires and to cause suffering. 
On this basis I do not consider 
unnaturalness to be intrinsically 
wrong. To take this position would 
be contrary to views that I hold in 
other areas of ethics where I think 
that it is irrelevant to object to 
contraception, for example, that it is 
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an unnatural interference with human 
reproduction. 
Peter Singer 
Monash University 
Australia 
(MORE OF THE SAME) 
Professor Harlan B. Miller 
Department of Philosophy & Religion 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute 
Blacksburg, Va. 24061 
Dear Dr. Miller: 
In a letter to me of August 12th, 
apparently written at the same 
instance as his letter to you, Peter 
Singer writes "I hope I had not misled 
you with the expressions that you 
have quoted. Animal Liberation was 
not written exclusively or even 
primarily for an audience of philoso­
phers and for that reason I may 
sometimes be guilty of writing in a 
way that would have the greatest 
possible impact on a general audience 
rather than in a way that is 
absolutely and literally accurate 
from a philosophical point of view." 
In view of this admission and the 
passages quoted in my last letter, 
think the issue is rather clear. 
Whether I "got it right" or "got it 
wrong" does not quite strike the 
right note. If Singer's rhetoric is 
inconsistent with what he takes to be 
his more rigorously held views, the 
problem lies either in the rhetoric 
or in the philosophy or in the 
character who unites the two. My 
task in my philosophical introduction 
to The Case of the Animals vs. Man 
was (in the passage that apparently 
stopped Mr. Johnson) to tease out the 
assumptions employed in appeals for 
animal rights, not to attempt to 
I 
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harmonize the premises of those appeals 
with other views of those who make 
.' 
them. I agree with Singer that there 
are problems with trying to render 
the idea of non-interference with 
nature categorical and respect his 
reluctance to make that attempt. I 
allude to some of those problems 
under the rubric of the word 'romatic.' 
But Singer's rhetoric does employ the 
notion of non-disturbance of nature 
and elicits part of its response on 
the basis of an expectation that the 
idea of naturalness will evoke some 
sentiments of protectiveness of the 
natural on the part of the reader. 
.If Mr. Singer wishes to disown the 
sentiments to which he appeals, 
candor would require him to do so 
publicly. After all, it was the 
dialectical employment of premises 
they did not themselves hold that 
gave a bad name to many of Socrates' 
most intellectually challenging 
contemporaries. 
Sincerely,* 
L. E. Goodman, D.Phil. 
Professor of Philosophy 
*i.e. in hopes that my rhetoric 
comports well with my sense. 
